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Abstract—Recognizing the pressing demands to secure em-
bedded applications, ARM TrustZone has been adopted in
both academic research and commercial products to protect
sensitive code and data in a privileged, isolated execution
environment. However, the design of TrustZone cannot prevent
physical memory disclosure attacks such as cold boot attack
from gaining unrestricted read access to the sensitive contents
in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM). A number
of system-on-chip (SoC) bound execution solutions have been
proposed to thaw the cold boot attack by storing sensitive data
only in CPU registers, CPU cache or internal RAM. However,
when the operating system, which is responsible for creating
and maintaining the SoC-bound execution environment, is
compromised, all the sensitive data is leaked.
In this paper, we present the design and development of
a cache-assisted secure execution framework, called CaSE, on
ARM processors to defend against sophisticated attackers who
can launch multi-vector attacks including software attacks and
hardware memory disclosure attacks. CaSE utilizes TrustZone
and Cache-as-RAM technique to create a cache-based isolated
execution environment, which can protect both code and data
of security-sensitive applications against the compromised OS
and the cold boot attack. To protect the sensitive code and
data against cold boot attack, applications are encrypted in
memory and decrypted only within the processor for execution.
The memory separation and the cache separation provided by
TrustZone are used to protect the cached applications against
compromised OS.
We implement a prototype of CaSE on the i.MX53 running
ARM Cortex-A8 processor. The experimental results show
that CaSE incurs small impacts on system performance when
executing cryptographic algorithms including AES, RSA, and
SHA1.
Keywords-TrustZone; Cache; Memory Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart devices are playing an increasingly important role
in our daily life. As the most widely deployed CPU in
mobile devices, ARM family processors have been used
in 4.5 billion mobile phones to process and store sensitive
data [1], [2]. For instance, around 51% of U.S. adults bank
online and 35% of them use mobile phones to perform
online transactions [3]. Meanwhile, fueled by the lucrative
black market for mobile malware, an increasing number of
system vulnerabilities have been identified and exploited to
compromise the mobile OS [4]. McAfee Lab reported a 24%
increase in the unique number of mobile malware in Q4
2015 [5].
To enhance the security of embedded systems, ARM
provides a hardware security extension named TrustZone to
protect sensitive code and data of applications in an isolated
execution environment against a potentially compromised
OS [6]. TrustZone has been widely adopted not only in
academic research projects [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
but also in commercial products [13], [14], [15]. However,
the design of TrustZone cannot prevent physical memory
disclosure attacks such as cold boot attacks [16], [17],
[18], [19]. Since mobile phones are frequently stolen, when
attackers have physical access to the mobile devices, they
can gain unrestricted access to the contents in the DRAM.
Unfortunately, TrustZone does not enforce encryption of
memory in the privileged environment like SGX [20], [21].
As a result, sensitive information, such as cryptographic key
material, is not secured even if it is stored in TrustZone
protected physical memory when adversaries have physical
access to the mobile device.
To protect against physical memory disclosure attacks,
SoC-bound execution solutions have been proposed to move
sensitive data out of DRAM and save them in proces-
sor registers [22], [23], [24], processor cache [25], [26],
[27], [18] or internal RAM [18]. All these SoC-bound
execution solutions can effectively thaw physical memory
attacks under a strong assumption that the OS, which is
responsible for creating and maintaining the SoC-bound
execution environment, can be trusted. The justification for
this design assumption is that when the OS is compromised,
there is no need for attackers to launch a cold boot attack,
because the OS can directly access the entire DRAM.
However, it is not true for ARM processors with TrustZone
support. Though TrustZone can prevent a malicious OS
from accessing protected secure memory, it cannot defend
against cold boot attacks. Thus, it is critical to protect mobile
systems against multi-vector attacks [28] including software
attacks and physical memory disclosure attacks.
In this paper, we propose a cache-assisted secure exe-
cution system called CaSE that can protect against both
software attacks and physical memory disclosure attacks on
ARM-based devices. The basic idea is to create a secure
environment in the CPU cache and use TrustZone to prevent
the potentially compromised OS from accessing the secure
environment. Thus, CaSE can protect both confidentiality
and integrity of the application’s code and data against both
software attacks and physical memory disclosure attacks.
To protect against physical memory disclosure attacks,
CaSE creates an execution environment inside the ARM pro-
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cessor by loading and executing an application completely
within the CPU cache. Cache is designed to be a hardware
mechanism that is transparent to the system software except
for a small number of maintenance instructions. Therefore,
we solve several challenges to create a cache-assisted exe-
cution environment.
First, to make computation SoC-bound, the application
code, data, stack and heap have to be stored in and only
in the cache. The memory for each component in the
application address space has to be allocated carefully to
eliminate cache contention. Unfortunately, none of the pub-
licly available ARM documents details the mapping from
memory addresses to cache line indexes. In order to correctly
place and optimize application memory in the cache, we
design and perform experiments to obtain cache mapping
schemes of the targeted hardware platform.
Second, once the application is loaded in the cache, we
make use of the hardware-assisted cache locking function
to pin down portions of the cache, without significantly im-
pacting the system performance. With the ability to control
eviction policy on cache lines that store the sensitive data, it
is possible to enable context switching between the protected
application and the rest of the system without concerning
the execution of other programs will cause eviction of the
sensitive contents from cache to DRAM.
Third, since the application is still encrypted when loaded
into DRAM, it needs to be decrypted completely within
cache before being executed. In many processor architec-
tures, including ARM, instruction cache and data cache are
not guaranteed to be coherent. When an application decrypts
its own code back into the process address space, instruction
cache and data cache become incoherent. Such issue of
incoherent cache caused by self-modifying programs is often
resolved by flushing the cache. In CaSE, flushing the cache
fails our efforts of running applications entirely inside the
SoC. To solve this problem, we synchronize the incoherent
data cache and instruction cache by utilizing the unified last
level cache in the processor.
TrustZone is used to protect the cache-assisted isola-
tion environment against an untrusted OS. Cache lines in
TrustZone-enabled ARM processors are built with an extra
non-secure (NS) bit to indicate whether the line belongs to
the secure world or the normal world. Therefore, the rich
OS in the normal world cannot access or manipulate the
cache lines used by the secure world. The secret key to
decrypt the application is saved in the secure world cache.
Without the key, a compromised rich OS cannot decrypt
the application code, which may be misused by attackers
to reverse engineer proprietary algorithms or find potential
vulnerabilities. CaSE offers two running modes depending
on whether secure world cache or normal world cache is
used to create the environment for the SoC-bound execution.
These two modes provide a trade-off between the system
security and the run-time performance.
We implement a prototype of CaSE on the i.MX53 run-
ning ARM Cortex-A8 processor. Using the CaSE, we show
that it is possible to execute a kernel integrity checker and a
suite of cryptographic algorithms including AES, RSA, and
SHA1 in the cache with small performance impacts.
In summary, we make the following contributions,
• We propose a secure cache-assisted SoC-bound exe-
cution framework that can protect sensitive code and
data of applications against both software attacks from a
compromised rich OS and physical memory disclosure
attacks that can gain unrestricted access to the DRAM.
• We present a systematic study on designing and secur-
ing our cache-assisted SoC-bound execution environ-
ment on ARM platforms. We demonstrate the appli-
cability of our system by prototyping several popular
cryptographic algorithms along with a kernel integrity
checker.
• We implement a prototype on the i.MX53 running
ARM Cortex-A8 processors. The experimental results
show that CaSE has small impacts on the system
performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces background knowledge. Section III
presents the threat model and assumptions. The CaSE ar-
chitecture is presented in Section IV. The prototype is
detailed in Section V. Section VI provides discussion on the
experimental results. The extensions of CaSE are discussed
in VIII. Related works are presented in Section IX. Finally,
Section X provides the conclusion of the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
We first introduce the ARM TrustZone hardware security
extension. Then we discuss the generic ARM cache archi-
tecture along with the changes in the cache design due to
the addition of TrustZone.
A. ARM TrustZone
TrustZone is a set of hardware security extensions, con-
sisting of modifications to the processor, memory, and
peripherals [6]. It has been supported since ARMv6, and
most of the recent ARM system-on-chip processors support
this security extension. The main purpose of TrustZone is
to provide an end-to-end, complete system isolation for
secure code execution. The isolated environment provided
by TrustZone is often referred to as the secure world, while
the traditional operational environment is often referred to
as the normal world, the non-secure world, or the rich OS.
Based on the world that the processor is in, different
system resources can be accessed. The security configuration
register (SCR) in the CP15 coprocessor is one of the registers
that can only be accessed while the processor is in the secure
world. SCR contains an NS (non-secure) bit that governs the
security context of the processor. When NS bit is cleared,
the processor is in the secure world. When NS bit is set,
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Figure 1: Cache Architecture in ARM TrustZone
the processor is in the normal world. The only exception is
when the processor is in the monitor mode, which can be
triggered by either interrupts or secure monitor call (SMC)
instruction.
B. Cache Architecture in ARM Processors
Cache is considered to be the first level memory system
in ARM. It is usually constructed with a fast and expensive
static random access memory (SRAM). Most of the current
processors have multiple levels of cache, including level one
(L1) cache, level two cache (L2), and translation lookaside
buffer (TLB). Modern high-end processors typically have 32
KB to 1 MB L1 cache, and the size of L2 ranges from 256
KB to 2 MB. Since cache is small compared to the total
amount of addressable memory, N-way set associative table
is often used to organize the cache.
A typical 4-way set associative table is shown in Figure. 1.
A physical memory address is indexed into k cache lines,
where k is the set size. As there are four tables of size k,
the way number is four. Therefore, for any given memory
address, it can be in kth set entry of any way. For each cache
line, there is a tag carrying the hash value of the index along
with the status bits. With the introduction of TrustZone in
the ARM architecture, all levels of cache have been extended
with an additional NS tag bit, which records the security state
of the transaction that accesses the memory [6]. It eliminates
the need for a cache flush when switching between the two
worlds, significantly improving the system performance. The
content of the caches, with regard to the security state, is
dynamic. Any cache line can be evicted to make space for
new data, regardless of its security state. In other words, it
is possible for a secure cache line fill to evict a non-secure
cache line, and vice versa.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Threat Model
Sophisticated cyber attacks nowadays involve multi-stage,
multi-vector attacks [28]. We assume that attackers can
use both software attacks and physical memory disclosure
attacks to obtain sensitive information in the DRAM.
1) Software Attack: Due to the increasing complexity of
the mobile OS kernel, attackers can often exploit various
kernel vulnerabilities to compromise the mobile OS. There-
fore, we assume that successful software attacks can lead to
the compromise of the OS and thus gain unrestricted access
to not only DRAM but also the CPU cache and registers.
It is well known that an adversary can use direct memory
access (DMA) attacks [29] to gain arbitrary access to phys-
ical memory on desktop computers through DMA channels
such as FireWire, Thunderbolt, and PCI Express. Though
DMA ports are not commonly available on current mobile
devices and USB ports are not DMA capable, it is still
possible for the attacker to misuse built-in DMA capable I/O
devices such as LCD controller and storage controller [4].
Therefore, we consider DMA attack as an attack vector
available to the compromised OS.
2) Physical Memory Disclosure Attack: With physical
access to the mobile devices, there are many types of
physical attacks, and it is hard to anticipate all of them.
For example, if the JTAG interface is enabled on production
systems, the attacker can connect a JTAG debugger to
manipulate system states of the normal world. Fortunately,
the secure world is protected from JTAG with the built-in
protections from TrustZone. Instead, the attacker can use
other advanced hardware to examine SoC internals or change
DRAM state [30].
In this work, we focus on physical memory disclosure
attacks, such as cold boot attacks [16], [17], [31], which
exploit the remanence effect of physical memory to gain
unrestricted read access to system memory. In general, there
are two types of cold boot attacks: (1) resetting the computer
to load a malicious OS from the attacker, and (2) unplugging
and placing DRAM chips into another machine controlled
by the attacker. Moreover, attackers can use bus snooping
attacks [32] to capture the sensitive data when it is being
loaded from or written to the DRAM. Note that though
TrustZone can be used to protect secure code execution
against the compromised rich OS in the normal world, the
DRAM used by the secure world is still vulnerable to a
physical memory disclosure attack since no encryption is
enforced on the DRAM.
B. Assumptions
We assume the ARM platform supports the TrustZone
hardware security extension. The high assurance boot (HAB)
and system isolation between the two worlds provided by
TrustZone can be trusted. We assume the secure application
running in the secure world can be trusted and will not
leak its information deliberately. The attackers can launch
various software attacks and physical memory disclosure
attacks in order to freely access the sensitive data in DRAM
memory. Moreover, after gaining the root privilege in the
normal world through software attacks, the attacker can also
access the CPU cache and registers of the normal world
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inside the processor. However, she will not be able to access
the processor cache or registers in the secure world due
to the protection of TrustZone. We assume that attackers
with physical access to the mobile devices cannot utilize
sophisticated hardware to access the SoC-bound data in
cache or registers. Side channel attacks such as timing and
power analysis are out of the scope of this paper.
IV. CASE ARCHITECTURE
CaSE is designed to provide a secure and isolated SoC-
bound execution using the commodity hardware components
running ARM processors. We first present our security goals
and then give a system overview which focuses on how these
goals are achieved in CaSE.
A. Security Goals
To protect against both software attacks and physical
memory disclosure attacks, we design CaSE to satisfy the
following security goals:
1) SoC-bound Execution Environment: The computation
and memory of the application shall be within the physical
boundary of the SoC. Since physical memory disclosure
attacks are capable of revealing all memory contents outside
the SoC, CaSE needs to use the memory that is within the
physical boundary of the SoC, such as on-chip memory or
processor cache to create a SoC-bound execution environ-
ment.
2) Isolated Execution Environment: The system shall
be able to provide an isolated execution environment. In
other words, it shall be able to bootstrap and maintain an
execution environment that is completely isolated from the
compromised mobile OS, including separation for processor,
memory, and peripherals. On ARM processors, TrustZone
can be used to achieve this goal.
3) Memory Protection Outside the Execution Environ-
ment: To protect both integrity and confidentiality of ap-
plication code and data, all program information outside the
physical boundary of the SoC shall be protected by cryp-
tography. More specifically, code and data of the application
shall be encrypted when they are saved into external DRAM
due to memory paging, context switch, etc.
B. CaSE Overview
The overall system architecture is shown in Figure. 2.
Cold boot attackers can gain unrestricted read access to all
external DRAM, including those used by the system as either
the secure world memory or the normal world memory. On
the other hand, software attacks allow adversaries to access
and manipulate memory contents of the normal world. The
protected application is encrypted in the DRAM to ensure
its confidentiality. When a user invokes an application, the
CaSE controller will first load the encrypted application into
the L2 unified cache. Then CaSE controller verifies and
decrypts the application completely within cache and sets
Figure 2: System Architecture
up the execution environment with cached memory. Using
the hardware-assisted memory protection by TrustZone, the
cache-based execution environment is isolated from software
attacks from the rich OS in the normal world. Lastly, the
application context is encrypted before written to memory
such that sensitive information never leaves the SoC in plain
text.
By executing applications only in the cache of an iso-
lated environment provided by TrustZone, CaSE can defend
against both software attacks that compromise the OS in the
normal world and physical memory disclosure attacks such
as cold boot attacks.
C. Constructing the SoC-bound Execution Environment
SoC-bound execution ensures that the execution of a piece
of code is entirely enclosed within the physical boundary of
the SoC. More specifically, the code, data, stack, and heap
of the application should all be allocated to the CPU cache.
Therefore, cold boot attacks cannot read either the program
state or the program itself. To enable a SoC-bound execution
in CPU cache, we need to solve several key challenges.
First, none of the publicly available ARM documents
describes the mapping from physical memory address to
cache line index in the cache way. We have to design and
perform experiments to figure out this mapping for both L1
and L2 caches in ARM processors. Our results indicate that
the cache organization of Cortex-A8 is similar to many other
platforms in x86 systems [33], [34]. Second, since there is
no direct access to cache lines from system software, we
need to develop a method to precisely load memory into
cache lines and avoid cache eviction during the load, run
75
and exit stages of the application. Third, when processor
cache is used to store both code and data, self-modifying
programs can cause cache incoherency between Instruction
Cache (I-Cache) and Data Cache (D-Cache) in the first level
cache. We solve this problem by redirecting memory write
to the second level unified cache, where the cache lines are
used for both instruction and data.
By tackling the three challenges above, our SoC-bound
execution can load both code and data into L2 cache and
protect the confidentiality of code and data against cold boot
attack. However, a compromised OS from software attacks
can still access the contents of the CPU cache. Therefore,
CaSE also needs to isolate the SoC-bound execution from
the compromised OS.
D. Isolating the SoC-bound Execution from Rich OS
TrustZone provides an NS flag in each cache line indicat-
ing its security state. Based on the security context of the
system, CPU cache is marked as either secure or normal.
We call the cache lines used by the secure world secure
cache and the ones used by the normal world normal cache.
TrustZone can ensure that the rich OS in the normal world
cannot access the secure cache. Thus, a straightforward
solution is to use secure cache to create the SoC-bound
execution environment, as shown in Figure. 2. Alternatively,
it is possible to use normal cache to protect sensitive code
and data against the rich OS. More details can be found in
Section V-A.
E. Memory Protection Outside the Execution Environment
In CaSE, processor cache is used to create a SoC-bound
execution environment. As long as sensitive data resides
within this environment, it will remain protected. However,
SoC-bound memory, such as cache, is often small in size.
When the protected application in CaSE attempts to relin-
quish resource for other applications, the program context
needs to be saved to external DRAM. In order to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of these sensitive data, any data
leaving the SoC boundary needs to have a checksum, which
is then encrypted along with the data. When this data is
loaded back in the SoC environment, it is decrypted within
the SoC and the integrity is verified with the checksum.
Due to the lack of hardware support automatic encryp-
tion/decryption like Intel SGX [20], the cryptographic pro-
tection for memory has to be provided by CaSE.
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, our design and implementation of the
CaSE architecture on the i.MX53 platform is presented.
Two execution modes using two TrustZone worlds are first
presented. The challenges and our solutions in creating
a cache-bound execution environment are then discussed.
Next, details on how to isolate the running environment
from the rich OS and secure the data outside the SoC are
Figure 3: Execution Flow using Secure Cache
presented. Lastly, the locked cache layout in our prototype
and two secure application prototypes of a cryptographic
library and a kernel integrity checker in CaSE are discussed.
A. Two SoC-bound Execution Modes
SoC-bound execution can be performed in either the
secure world or the normal world, and these two execution
modes offer a trade-off between system security and perfor-
mance. The overall execution flows of the two modes are
introduced in the following.
1) Execution Flow Using Secure Cache: The CaSE se-
cure mode uses secure cache to create the SoC-bound exe-
cution environment. As shown in Figure. 3, when a request
to run a secure application is received, the CaSE controller
loads the encrypted application in the secure cache. After
being decrypted completely within the secure cache, the
application will run in the secure world until it finishes
and sends the results to the normal world. Since the rich
OS cannot access secure cache, it is not necessary to clean
the application execution environment. Figure. 3 shows that
in the second run of the same application, the processor
can simply branch to the application entry address in the
secure cache. Thus, for frequently invoked applications such
as cryptographic modules, this property can improve the
system performance by eliminating repeated loading and
decryption of the application. However, since we run the
secure application in the secure world, it will increase the
size of the code running in the secure world of the system.
2) Execution Flow Using Normal Cache: Since the nor-
mal cache can be read, flushed or invalidated by the rich OS,
it seems difficult, if not impossible, to protect normal cache
from a compromised rich OS. CaSE solves this problem by
relying on temporal separation rather than space separation
of the resource. To achieve the temporal isolation between
the secure application and the rich OS, we suspend the rich
OS when the secure application is running in the normal
world.
As shown in Figure. 4, when a secure application needs
to run, the rich OS will help load the encrypted application
into the cache and set up the execution environment in the
normal world. After the system switches to the secure world,
the rich OS will be suspended. Then the CaSE controller will
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Figure 4: Execution Flow using Normal Cache
check the integrity of the application code and its execution
environment. If successfully verified, the application payload
is decrypted in the cache by an unpacker provided by the
CaSE framework. Lastly, control flow will be directed to the
application entry function from the unpacker.
For most secure applications such as kernel integrity
checking, there is no information that needs to be retained
between consecutive executions. However, there are some
applications whose states between executions should be kept.
Since the application context stored in the CPU cache cannot
be protected once the control flow is directed back to the rich
OS, we need to encrypt the application context before saving
it to the memory.
The benefit of using normal cache is to reduce code
running in the secure world since the application runs in
the normal world and it cannot compromise the secure world
even if it has a vulnerability. When the application execution
makes use of the normal world cache, it is necessary to
clean the application context including the cache lines and
registers before exiting the application and resuming the rich
OS.
As a result, the environment needs to be instantiated and
torn down each time the same secure application runs, which
has an impact on the system performance.
B. Cache-Assisted SoC-bound Execution on ARM Processor
We tackle three challenges in creating a cache-based
SoC-bound execution. First, to optimize the use of the
limited cache size, the mapping from memory address to
cache lines has to be explored. Unfortunately, neither the
architecture document nor the processor document provides
details on this translation. We design experiments on real
ARM processors to figure out the detailed mappings. The
second challenge is to load and lock both code and data
of the application along with the execution environment
within the physical boundary of the processor. The third
challenge is to handle self-modifying programs, particularly,
the decryption of the packed application code in the cache.
1) Reversing Cache Structures: One of the key enablers
of our system is the ability to reliably maintain contents in
the processor cache. In order to maximize cache utilization,
we need to know exactly how the cache controller maps
memory addresses to cache set indexes. Only with such
knowledge can we precisely and reliably utilize the entire
cache. To figure out the mapping from physical addresses to
cache set numbers, we first flush both L1 and L2. An LDR
instruction is used to trigger a cache line fill on the memory
location. Once the cache line is filled, we use STR instruction
to change the values in the cache. Individual cache lines are
then invalidated by set and way iteratively. When the set and
way being invalidated is the same as the set and way that was
used for the cache line fill, the loaded value after invalidation
would be different from the value before the invalidation. By
repeating this test on different physical memory addresses,
we successfully reverse the cache indexing scheme. On
ARM Cortex-A8 processors, we conclude that the mapping
from memory to cache is linear.
2) Loading in and Locking down Cache: It is critical
in CaSE to load and store the application and its execu-
tion environment completely only within the cache. ARM
architecture offers the ability to lock down cache entries so
that system developers can optimize the cache performance
on embedded devices. We utilize this hardware function to
lock all the cache lines used by the secure application. The
pseudocode for cache locking is shown in Listing 1.
The first step of loading memory into cache is to configure
the memory address to be cacheable. Memory in the ARM
architecture can be categorized into three types, strongly or-
dered, device, and normal. Furthermore, for normal memory,
there are three caching strategy, write-back, write-through,
and write-allocate. Write-back and write-through are mutu-
ally exclusive. The caching attributes on ARM processors
are controlled by various registers, including system control
(SysCtrl) register, aux control register, L2 lockdown register,
L2 aux control register, as well as page table entry. The pag-
ing table entry controls the caching strategy of the address
location using the type extension (TEX), bufferable (B), and
cacheable (C) bits. The combination of the 4 bits yields
various caching strategies for the memory address location.
However, it can be remapped via the tex remap enable (TRE)
remapping capability in ARM. TRE allows an operating
system to have finer granularity control of the types and
provides additional room to store OS specific information.
When TRE is enabled, memory attributes are mapped to
primary region remap register (PRRR) and normal region
remap register (NRRR).
Since any data written to write-through cacheable memory
is directly forwarded to DRAM, we set the cache strategy of
the targeted memory area to be write-back, so that memory
modifications will be buffered in the cache.
ARM processors provide hardware-assisted cache locking
on L2 cache as part of coprocessor functions in CP15. The
cache lock register allows system designers to enable and
disable the allocation of individual cache way. Once the
cache allocation is disabled, the locked cache lines will never
be evicted. On the i.MX53, the granularity of L2 cache lock-
ing is by individual ways of the cache. Other platforms have
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1 d i s a b l e l o c a l i r q ( ) ;
e nab l eCach i ng (memArea ) ;
3 d i s a b l eC a c h i n g ( l oade rCode ) ;
d i s a b l eC a c h i n g ( l o a d e r S t a c k ) ;
5 i n v a l i d a t e c a c h e ( v i r t u a l a d d r e s s o f memArea ) ;
unlockWay ( wayToFi l l ) ;
7 lockWay ( al lWay XOR wayToF i l l ) ;
whi le ( has more t o l o ad in memArea )
9 LDR r0 , [memArea + i ] ;
lockWay ( wayToF i l l ) ;
11 unlockWay ( al lWay XOR wayToFi l l ) ;
Listing 1: Lock Memory in Cache
different cache locking functionality enabled. For instance,
Tegra 3 supports a finer cache locking granularity on each
cache line [35].
Using the hardware cache lock is straightforward, but the
challenge lies in how to place memory contents in L2 cache
instead of L1 cache. This is because we can only lock cache
lines in L2 cache. The presence of a cache line in one
cache level does not necessarily guarantee its appearance
in the other levels. For inclusive cache, any cache line in
L1 cache is also in L2 cache. Intel processors largely adopt
this inclusive cache paradigm [36]. On the other hand, for
exclusive cache, any line in L1 cache is not in L2 cache,
and AMD processors usually follow this exclusive cache
paradigm [37]. However, for ARM Cortex-A8 processors,
there is no indication of inclusiveness or exclusiveness in
any document. A closer examination of the cache fill strategy
reveals that when there is a cache miss on data or instruction,
a cache line fill to both L1 and L2 from the advanced
extensible interface (AXI) bus will be triggered. Thus, cache
line should be cleaned before executing LDR instruction on
a memory address.
The code and data that are used in the cache loading have
to be configured to the non-cacheable attribute. Otherwise
the code itself can be loaded in the cache, causing unin-
tended evictions of the cache lines that need to be locked.
Upon completion of cache filling, the cache way can then be
locked. With the cache lines locked in L2 cache, the physical
memory addresses corresponding to these cache lines can
be used as cache-based memory. In the ARM Cortex-A8
processor, L2 cache locking is achieved via the L2 cache
lockdown register [38].
3) CPU Bound Application Decryption: One of the sys-
tem design goals of CaSE is to offer code confidentiality,
which is a challenging task. First, the file storage is in the
normal world, so the application has to be encrypted while
it is saved in the file system. Second, memory contents
of neither the normal world nor the secure world are
protected from cold boot attacks, so the application has to be
encrypted in the DRAM as well. Lastly, the rich OS can be
compromised by malware. As a result, the application can
only be decrypted either when the rich OS is not running
or in the secure world where the rich OS cannot interfere.
One of the well-established binary manipulation techniques,
code encryption [39], [40], is used to tackle this challenge.
We develop a cache-only packer, CaSE Packer, which uses
AES to encrypt the code and data of the CaSE application.
The entire code to be executed is loaded into cache. The
unpacker then decrypts the encrypted code and places them
back in the same position inside the cached memory, so
that the code will remain in cache. CaSE packer, however,
has a unique difference from existing application packers on
handling the decryption process, due to the cache coherency
problems in the ARM platform.
In modern processors [41], [37], [36], [38], the L1 cache
(also known as the primary cache) is often split into two
parts of equal size, the instruction cache (I-Cache) to speed
up executable instruction fetch and data cache (D-Cache) to
speed up data fetch and store. The instruction cache is often
preloaded with binaries of the executable speculatively using
algorithms in the hardware. However, this magic speedup
falls apart when application modifies its own code in mem-
ory. In many processor architectures including ARM, the I-
Cache and D-Cache are not guaranteed to be coherent, and
it is up to the system software to handle cache coherency.
During the decryption of the application payload, the
ciphertext needs to be loaded into the cache first. This
will trigger a cache line fill into the L1 cache. When the
ciphertext is decrypted, the results are stored using an STR
instruction. Due to the close locality between the ciphertext
and plaintext, the cache lines that were filled with the
encrypted text will be used by the processor to store the
decrypted text. Since I-Cache and D-Cache are separated in
L1, the STR instruction will place the decrypted plaintext
code in the L1 D-Cache of the processor. When the control
flow is branched to the newly decrypted code, the L1 I-
Cache will fetch the instructions from the L2 unified cache
instead of the L1 D-Cache because of the cache hierarchy.
Therefore, the processor will execute the encrypted code,
which will most likely generate an undefined instruction
exception.
This problem is often described as the cache coherency
issue between I-Cache and D-Cache. The recommended
approach to this problem is to flush out the affected portion
or the entire cache to the point of coherence (PoC). Cache
contents are written to memory to make sure all masters
in the system see the same copy of memory content.
Unfortunately, this approach is not suitable for SoC-bound
execution, since flushing out contents to memory defeats
the purpose of SoC-bound execution. On some platforms, it
is also possible to use cache maintenance instruction clean
to point of unification (PoU) to synchronize the internal
caches. PoU is the point by which the instruction and data
caches and the translation table walks of that processor are
guaranteed to see the same copy of a memory location [41].
The location of PoU is platform and environment dependent.
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For example, the PoU for Cortex-A15 can be either the L1
data cache or the external memory [42]. Though the location
of PoU for ARM Cortex-A8 processor is not explicitly
documented in the manual, we find through observations
in the platform that it is possible to use the clean to PoU
instruction to synchronize the internal I-Cache and D-Cache.
Besides using specific instruction, we also devise a
method to manually load code into unified cache so that
the same method can be used on other platforms where
synchronized to PoU instruction is not suitable. Since L2
is a unified cache, synchronization between I-Cache and D-
Cache is not needed. We first invalidate the cache lines in L1
for the code memory location. After L1 is cleaned, we use
write-alloc feature in L2 cache to write to only the unified
L2 cache. When write-alloc in the L2 auxiliary control is
set, STR instruction will trigger only the L2 cache fill. We
use this method in CaSE packer to enable the decryption of
the application.
C. Securing Cache-Assisted SoC-bound Execution
It is not an easy task to secure the cache-assisted SoC-
bound execution on ARM processors. In the following, some
key design efforts to secure the execution environment are
presented.
1) Key Management: Applications are encrypted and
packed with a secret key to protect code confidentiality.
This key should be stored in the secure storage provided
by TrustZone. In our implementation, we make use of the
second generation Security Controller (SCC) equipped on
the i.MX53 SoC. Using the platform key that is stored in
e-Fuse based secure storage on SCC, we encrypt the CaSE
master key and store it along with the TrustZone code. When
the system boots, the master key is decrypted and stored in
the secure cache.
2) Secure Code Loading in Normal Cache: In order to
load the CaSE application in the normal cache, the loading
operation should be carried out in the normal world. Since
the rich OS may be compromised, we must verify the
integrity of the encrypted application code in the secure
world. However, according to the TrustZone cache design,
the secure world cannot access the contents in the normal
cache. Therefore, it becomes a challenge for the integrity
checker in the secure world to verify the integrity of CaSE
application in the normal cache.
We use the cache array access feature in the CP15
coprocessor to overcome this difficulty. The cache array
function allows a process running in the secure world to
retrieve the contents of cache lines whether they are tagged
as secure or non-secure. Specifically, we use the c9 function
to read the cache tags and lines into the general purpose
registers for inspection. However, since the parameter used
in this function is the physical cache array index instead of
the cache line index and there is no one-to-one mapping from
the array index to the memory location, we have to carry
out several experiments to work out the mapping from the
physical array index to the cache set and way number. After
obtaining the cache tag, we can reconstruct the physical
address for each cache line. Then, the memory contents can
be used to verify the integrity of the code in the normal
cache.
The application stored in the cache is indexed and tagged
with physical address, while the processor executes in-
structions using virtual address. If an attacker inserts a
malicious translation from the virtual address to the physical
address, she could redirect the control flow of CaSE into
any arbitrary physical address [43]. To defend against this
memory address translation redirection attack, the translation
needs to be locked down in the TLB cache as well.
TLB lockdown function in Cortex-A8 processor is based
on the modification of eviction policy [41]. To lock down an
entry, the TLB cache for the address has to be cleared out
first. The TLB lockdown register is then modified to indicate
which TLB line to fill for the next result of translation table
walk. To fill the intended address translation at this position,
a TLB preload instruction is executed to force hardware to
perform a page table walk. Once the cache is filled, the
TLB lockdown register is modified again to never evict the
entry to achieve the TLB lock. However, similar to the
L2 cache, TLB cache is also extended with an extra NS
bit for the TrustZone architecture. Therefore, if the TLB
preload instruction is performed in the secure world, the
corresponding translation is for the secure world only. To
resolve this problem, we fill the TLB in the normal world
and then use the TLB data access array function in CP15
coprocessor to verify the translation.
3) Application Context Sanitization: The CaSE applica-
tion context consists of the decrypted code, the decrypted
data, stack, and heap. All of them are considered sensitive.
When the application finishes execution, the context needs to
be sanitized. There are two ways to perform the sanitization:
overwriting the cache contents or invalidating the cache
lines.
When cache overwriting is used, all sensitive cached
memory locations are written with a known pattern using
STR instruction. Then all the cache lines are flushed out to
the DRAM such that the changes to the memory is written to
DRAM and is no longer cached. When the cache invalidation
method is used, all sensitive cache memory addresses are
invalidated using the cache maintenance operation invalidate
by modified virtual address (MVA). When the cache memory
is invalidated, the cache line is marked as invalid. Thus, all
values in the cache line pertaining to the memory address
become invalid.
We choose to use the cache invalidation method because
it can be used to verify that no sensitive context information
is leaked to the memory. To check for cache leaking after
the execution of a protected application, we first write pre-
defined pattern to the memory location that would be used
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for the application runtime environment before loading the
application. The cache is then flushed to make sure the
predefined pattern is in the DRAM. At the end of execution,
cache lines used for application execution are invalidated. If
there is no cache leak, the result of the LDR instruction
should return the pre-defined pattern. Otherwise, if the
sensitive cache lines had been evicted during the execution
of the protected application, then the value will be different.
4) Handling Cache Coherency between TrustZone
Worlds: The cache coherency issue between the normal
world and the secure world creates not only the challenge for
integrity verification, but also the delivery of computation
output. In some application configurations, when the
output is cached in the secure world, it is not immediately
available to the normal world. For our cryptography library
prototypes, the results of encryption that are cached in the
secure world are not accessible by the CaSE driver in the
normal world until the cache lines are evicted.
To make the output immediately available to users in the
normal world, the CaSE application in the secure world
has to flush the outputs that are being cached. However,
we cannot simply flush the entire cache, since sensitive
contents in the cache will also be written to DRAM. There
are two methods to solve this problem: clean by MVA or
clean by set and way of individual level of cache. When
the clean by MVA method is used, CaSE needs to invoke
clean by MVA for all the memory addresses of the output
buffer. When the clean by set and way method is used,
CaSE needs to walk through all the non-sensitive sets in
all ways across all cache layers. More specifically, since L1
does not provide locking capability, there is no way to know
if a line contains sensitive data or the computation results.
Therefore, all the lines in L1 are clean. However, for L2,
we know the memory organization of cache ways that are
locked. Thus, we can clean all the non-sensitive sets and
ways. Our implementation uses the aforementioned method
based on the size of the output. When the size of the output
is large, it is better to flush the all the non-sensitive cache.
On the i.MX53, c7 c10 system coprocessor function is
invoked with opcode 1 to clean the set and way, and the
same function is invoked with opcode 2 to clean by MVA
to point of coherency (PoC). Point of coherency is where the
processor core and other masters such as DMA controller
see the same copy. For i.MX53, PoC is the DDR memory.
5) Securing Across Power States: An energy-conscious
mobile device will switch the processor into different power
states to save energy. When the processor is put in the
sleep state, power supply to processor cache is cut down,
so all data stored in the cache will be erased. This poses a
challenge for CaSE, which uses processor cache to create
the execution environment.
A simple solution is to keep the cache powered. Both
L1 cache and L2 cache can be placed in a different power
domain than the integral core. However, this approach has
its drawback in power consumption. Modern cache is often
constructed with SRAM, which consumes more power than
DRAM. An alternative method is to store the cache context
in memory that is physically inside the SoC, such as
the on-chip RAM (OCRAM). However, many BSPs have
claimed the usage of OCRAM for other subsystems [44].
Furthermore, some platforms might not have built-in support
to include OCRAM in the secure domain.
In CaSE, we adopt the method that encrypts the cache and
saves it in DRAM when the device is in power saving modes.
When the system sleeps, the rich OS notifies the CaSE
controller to encrypt the cache contents with the master
key and then save them into the DRAM. When the system
resumes, the contents are loaded back from the DRAM into
the cache along with the master key recovered from the
secure storage.
D. Application Development
CPU Cache is one of the key elements to improve system
performance in modern processor design. Cache-assisted
SoC-bound execution system will inevitably have an impact
on the system performance when locking down portions
of cache for special usage. Therefore, it is important to
optimize the usage of locked cache. We first present the
general layout of the locked cache and then our prototypes
of two secure applications using CaSE.
1) Layout of Locked Cache Way: In a typical layout of
CaSE application, we place the master key, which is used
to decrypt CaSE applications in the first set of the way,
followed by the encrypted code and data sections of the
CaSE application. CaSE packer code and the environment
setup code are immediately after that. Lastly, the rest of the
cache lines in the way are used for stack and heap of the
application.
There are several essential components for the execution
of a binary image, including the libraries, the virtual memory
address space layout, code packer/unpacker, and the stack
and heap. First, applications cannot use the library provided
by the rich OS, since the library integrity cannot be guar-
anteed. Therefore, CaSE applications need to be statically
linked into the binary itself. For our prototypes, we make an
effort to modify all the code so that they are self-contained.
This is also a byproduct of the effort to minimize the binary
code size.
Second, the physical address of the application address
space needs to be carefully crafted to fit in a single cache
way without causing a collision on the same cache set. We
create a set of linker scripts to work with our customized
CaSE loader instead of using the default loader and linker
script. More specifically, the linker script configures the start
address of the binary and the section arrangements.
Third, a CaSE packer is used to encrypt the application
binary to provide code confidentiality outside the cache. The
packer in our prototype uses AES encryption in CBC mode.
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Using our own loader simplifies the design of the packer
and unpacker, since it is not necessary to implement all the
ELF file standards.
Lastly, a custom heap and stack is provided. The stack
is allocated by the CaSE loader from the cache memory.
Furthermore, we create a simple heap management library,
which allocates heap spaces in the cached memory, as well.
2) Two Secure Applications: Unlike the previous ap-
proaches [22], [24], [26] that are designed for a specific
algorithm, CaSE offers a generic execution environment. In
other words, users do not need in-depth knowledge of the
application to create a SoC-bound execution. We develop
two secure applications using CaSE application framework.
First, we build a cryptography library by porting AES,
RSA, and SHA1 from polarSSL library [45]. Cryptography
is one of the fundamental building blocks in modern day
computer and network security. Due to the small size of
cryptography libraries, it is feasible to place them in the
secure cache. The unique advantage of executing in the
secure world is the ability to switch context without en-
vironment sanitization. As shown later in the experiments,
this execution mode has little performance impact on the
rich OS, yet offering enhanced security protection. We place
AES, RSA and SHA1 all into one library called CaSE
crypto library. By combining SHA1 and RSA in the same
library, we are able to save some code space due to the use
of shared library. Lastly, we need less than one L2 cache
way to construct the CaSE cryptography library execution
environment.
Second, we build a kernel integrity checker that is invoked
periodically to verify the integrity of the rich OS kernel code
page. In particular, we calculate a SHA1 checksum of the all
the kernel code pages to make sure that it is not modified
by any malicious software. Most development efforts are
to remove the dependency on the rest of the polarSSL
library and the c standard library. We run the kernel integrity
checker as normal world SoC-bound execution application,
since there could be different implementations of system
integrity check and it is difficult to include all variances
in the secure code base of the system. Thus, the normal
world execution environment is more suitable for the kernel
integrity checker.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce the experiment setup
in VI-A. The sizes of various system codes are exam-
ined in VI-B. Cache behavior on the platform is studied
in VI-C. The last part of the evaluation in VI-D examines
the performance of CaSE application system as well as the
performance impact of cache locking on the system.
A. Experiment Setup
We implement our prototype of CaSE on the FreeScale
i.MX53 mobile development board. It features a single ARM
Cortex-A8 processor with 1GB DDR3 DRAM and 128 KB
onboard internal RAM (iRAM) and 16 KB secure iRAM.
The system boots with onboard flash along with the uboot
and kernel supplied by the Micro-SD card inserted. We use
the FreeScale Android 2.3.4 platform with a 2.6.33 Linux
kernel. There are two levels of cache in the ARM Cortex-A8
processor. Both the L1 data cache and L1 instruction cache
are 4 way 128 set associative cache with 32 KB size. L2
cache is an 8 way 512 set associative cache with 256 KB
size. The Android OS is ported from secure domain to the
normal domain based on the Board Support Package (BSP)
published by Adeneo Embedded [44].
B. Code Size
The system TCB consists of three components. The first
component is the trusted boot code, which is about 500
source line of code (SLOC). The second component is CaSE
controller, which is responsible for handling CaSE environ-
ment initialization and clean up. It has approximately 500
SLOC of code. The third component is related to specific
application implementation. In CaSE, we use SHA1 to check
the integrity of isolated execution environment cache, and
AES to encrypt application state while it is paused. The
SHA1 implementation is 166 SLOC, and the AES is 579
SLOC. In total, there is 745 SLOC for the cryptographic
libraries. This additional SLOC does not necessarily have to
be included in the TCB if the system only requires secure
execution mode.
While SLOC number offers a good estimation of the size
of the TCB, it is also important to show the size of the
binary code for SoC-bound execution. This gives an idea of
the feasibility of fitting the application in the cache. On the
Cortex-A8 processor, one L2 cache way is 32 KB.
Application Code+Data (KB)
AES 2.4
RSA 10
SHA1 5
CaSE Crypto Lib 17.4
Kernel Integrity Checker 6.6
CaSE Packer 2.8
Packed CaSE Crypto Lib 20.4
Packed Kernel Checker 9.5
Table I: CaSE Application Size
The code size shown in Table I is compiled from C and
assembly source code using ARM Thumb-II encoding. We
turn on the ARM interworking mode during code generation
in the compiler. This increases the code size but makes
it easier to interwork with the ARM code in our security
monitor. With careful coding between function calls, one
can remove this compiler flag to further reduce the size of
the binary code.
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C. Cache Bound Verification
Cache-bound verification is designed to verify the security
attributes of CaSE. Specifically, there are several aspects of
the system we want to verify. First, we need to verify that
the location of the CaSE application data indeed exists only
in cache, and there is no cache leak during the execution of
the program. Second, we want to verify that the processor
cache that has been locked down using hardware functions
cannot be read or written by the DMA attacks. Third, we
examine the interaction of the locked cache lines with cache
maintenance operations.
1) Verifying Applications Exist Only in Cache: The pri-
mary goal of this test is to show that the sensitive application
is indeed in and only in the processor cache. Furthermore,
we want to verify that the CaSE execution environment will
not leak any application code or data into the DRAM at
any point in time during the execution. Without hardware
support, it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify this
property for each processor clock cycle the application uses.
We choose two points in the execution flow that are likely
to show leaked contents if the cache had been flushed to
memory. The first point of inspection is at the completion of
unpacking action. The second point is when CaSE execution
completes, but before the environment is cleaned up.
In this test, we use the packed kernel check application as
the test case. We inspect right after unpacking and when the
kernel check completes. For both tests, we instrument the
code to invoke leakage check routine right after the unpack
operation and kernel check. The leakage routine is stored
in memory outside CaSE application. The check routine
will invalidate all the cache lines occupied by the CaSE
application, and then read back the memory location. If the
read back value is not the default value for those memory
(0xFFFFFFFF), then there is a leak from the protected
application. In both points of execution, we detect no leak
in the CaSE environment from cache to memory. In order to
assure that there is no integer value of 0xFFFFFFFF leaked,
we also try another pattern (0xABABABAB), and the results
are the same.
2) Verifying the Effect of DMA Attack on Cache: One of
the main design objectives of CaSE execution is to defend
against compromised rich OS. Even though the rich OS
is paused during the execution of CaSE application in the
normal world, it is still possible for the rich OS to program
an I/O device to perform DMA memory read and write to
the normal world memory. To see how DMA will interact
with cache lines, we program the serial controller to perform
DMA read and write to the memory that we lock in cache.
More specifically, we load the application in the normal
world cache, and use a kernel module in the normal world to
program the serial port using DMA to dump memory over
serial. We observe that the dump fails to extract contents
from cache.
3) Verifying the Effects of Maintenance Operations on
Locked Cache: This test studies the effects of cache main-
tenance operations on locked cache lines on the i.MX53 and
verifies that secure cache cannot be manipulated by cache
maintenance operations executed in the normal world.
Common cache maintenance operations include cache
clean and cache invalidation. These cache maintenance op-
erations are coprocessor functions that can only be initiated
by the CPU itself. Thus, attackers can only launch cache
maintenance attack from the rich OS. When one CaSE
application is running in the normal cache, the rich OS is
suspended, so there is no software attack from the rich OS.
However, when the rich OS resumes the system control, it
can attempt to use cache maintenance operations to launch
attacks on the secure cache, where the master key and the
secure CaSE application are stored. In this experiment, we
want to verify that malicious code loaded in the rich OS
cannot clean or invalidate the secure cache.
We begin the experiment by writing 0xFF to all the
memory buffers. We then fill one cache way with normal
world cache lines of pattern 0xAB, and another with secure
cache lines with pattern 0xBC. Once the two ways are
locked, we use the CaSE driver in the normal world to
execute the cache maintenance operation. To see if cache
clean instruction in the normal world can evict the locked
cache lines, we execute clean instruction on all the locked
cache lines in both the secure world and the normal world.
If the cache contents were written to memory due to the
clean instruction, the value read back will be 0xAB for
normal world and 0xBC for secure world. In our experiment,
memory in the normal world reads back as 0xAB while the
memory in the secure world reads back as 0xFF. This verifies
that cache clean instruction invoked by the normal world
will not be able to affect cache lines in the secure world.
We follow a similar procedure for cache invalidation, except
that INVD instruction is used instead. We observe that cache
lines in the normal world are invalidated, because the read
back value is 0xFF, while values read back from the cache
lines in secure world remain 0xBC. Therefore, the rich OS
cannot use cache maintenance instruction to manipulate the
cache lines of the secure world.
D. SoC-bound Execution Performance
We study the performance of the system by examining
the time breakdown of the CaSE application execution. We
also compare the performance difference when the secure
application is running in the normal cache or the secure
cache.
1) CaSE Isolated Application Performance: As a case
study, we use the kernel integrity checker as a normal
world application. The packed CaSE kernel integrity check
application is 9.5 KB in size. The timing breakdown for each
major operation in the CaSE execution is shown in Table II.
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Operation Time (μs)
Environment Preparation 613
Environment Integrity Check 1540
CaSE Unpacking 5973
Kernel Check 18676
Environment Cleanup 412
Total Time 27214
Table II: Kernel Integrity Checker in Normal Cache
From the time breakdown, we can see that though environ-
ment setup and cleanup consume some processor cycles, the
major computation overhead originates from the unpacking
process, which decrypts the encrypted CaSE application
payload. The entire kernel check takes 0.02 second to
complete, and the application context saving time is 94 μs.
2) CaSE Secure Application Performance: Using the
crypto library as a case study for the CaSE secure execution
mode, we measure the benchmarks for a secure cache execu-
tion similar to the normal cache execution. Table III shows
the time breakdown of a secure call to perform encryption
using AES CBC mode. In the secure mode, the cache is
protected against the compromised rich OS. Therefore, it is
not necessary to clean up the execution environment.
Operation Time (μs)
World Switching 2.6
AES CBC Encrypt (1KB) 443
Output Synchronization (1KB) 2
Total Time 447.6
Table III: AES Encryption in Secure Cache
3) Performance Trade-off between Execution Modes: To
find out the impact of SoC-bound execution environment on
application performance, we run AES, RSA, and SHA1 in
different environments and compare their performance. First,
we port the application into a kernel module and load the
module into the rich OS to measure the performance without
any security enhancement. Second, we run the application
in the two CaSE execution environments, one in the normal
world and the other in the secure world. We consider that
the first experiment should achieve similar performance as
other kernel encryption solutions, and should serve as a
good baseline for comparison. On the other hand, the CaSE
execution will suffer performance penalty for the enhanced
security.
The experimental results on AES algorithm are shown
in Figure. 5. The performance of secure executed AES is
almost identical to that of generic AES. The secure AES
has a small advantage over the generic kernel AES when
the memory buffer to be encrypted is small. This is due
to preloaded cache lines for the AES data section. For
Figure 5: AES Speed Comparison
smaller size encryption requests, the normal cache execution
is significantly slower than the other two methods. This
is because the environment is created and destroyed for
each request in order to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the execution environment. However, as the size
of the plaintext increases, the difference in the encryption
bandwidth diminishes. This is because the overhead to create
and destroy the environment becomes insignificant.
We have also performed the same set of experiments on
RSA algorithm and SHA1 algorithm. The results for RSA
algorithm are shown in Figure. 6. In this experiment, we
measure the number of 1024-bit RSA decryptions that the
system can carry out in one second. Similar to AES, the
normal cache execution takes a penalty in the environment
initialization and clean up. However, as the number of
messages in the request becomes larger, this fixed cost can
be ignored. Lastly, we also benchmark the performance of
SHA1. We build up our test case by sending fixed size 512
byte packet to the SHA1 module to calculate the hash. Due
to simplicity of SHA1, the normal world execution overhead
is high when the number of messages per request is low.
Similar to RSA and AES, the environment penalty becomes
small as the number of messages increases.
Figure 6: Comparison of RSA Operation
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Figure 7: Comparison of SHA1 Operation
4) Impact of Cache Locking: Cache is originally designed
to enhance system performance. When it is locked intention-
ally for non-performance reason, the system suffers. We use
various benchmarking tools to assess the impact of cache
locking on the system performance when different portions
of cache are locked down. In our implementation, only one
way of the L2 cache is locked to reduce the impact on the
system.
This experiment is designed to explore the trade-offs
between the size of the CaSE application and the impact
on system performance due to its monopoly on the L2
cache of the system. We use three benchmarking tools,
randspeed [46], linpack [47] and AnTuTu [48]. RandMem
measures the performance of random access on large array
of memory [46]. The performance benchmark of this tool
relates closely to the performance of the memory subsystem.
Therefore, with more cache locked away, the system suffers
bigger penalty in memory performance. Since Linpack mea-
sures integer operation speed of the system [47], the reduc-
tion in L2 cache has a smaller impact in LinPack benchmark.
Lastly, AnTuTu [48] is a comprehensive benchmark suite. It
measures the performance of the system in integer compu-
tation, float point operation, 2D and 3D graphic rendering
etc. AnTuTu can provide the overall system impact when
the L2 cache is locked.
As shown in Figure. 8, locking one out of eight ways
in L2 cache has at most 3% performance penalty. However,
the overall system performance degrades more quickly when
more than 60% of the L2 cache is locked and becomes
unavailable. This pattern is consistent with other benchmarks
in the AnTuTu suite including 2D GPU, single thread integer
operation, and multi-thread integer operation.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
With the physical possession of the mobile device, adver-
saries have two attack vectors, software attack and cold boot
attack. We assume that attackers with physical access can
only examine contents of the physical memory but not the
cache and registers inside the processor. The attack model is
Figure 8: Performance Impact of L2 Cache Locking
summarized in Table IV. The adversary who compromises
the rich OS can gain unrestricted read and write access to the
normal memory and cache, but neither the secure memory
nor the secure cache. The adversary who utilizes cold boot
attacks can gain unrestricted read access to the memory of
both the normal world and the secure world, but not the
cache contents.
CaSE is designed to protect confidentiality and integrity of
the application. Applications are encrypted with a checksum
while stored in memory. Code and the data of the application
are only decrypted in the cache-assisted SoC-bound execu-
tion environment.
A. Software Attacks from Compromised Rich OS
In the CaSE execution using normal cache, the rich OS
is suspended by disabling all local interrupts. There is
no Non-Maskable interrupt (NMI) on the i.MX53. When
CaSE is built on platforms with NMI, system designers
should redirect these interrupts to TrustZone temporarily
for secure processing. With the OS suspended, it cannot
launch any attacks to compromise either the integrity or the
confidentiality of the processor cache.
In the CaSE execution using secure cache, the rich OS
cannot read or modify the secure memory or the secure
cache. This is because the memory space is completely
separated between the two worlds by TrustZone. To improve
performance during context switching, the CaSE execution
environment in the secure cache is not sanitized. Because
of this design choice, the rich OS may also attempt to use
cache maintenance instruction to evict the secure cache out
to DRAM, and then use cold boot attack to read out the
DRAM contents. However, we verify via experiments that
cache maintenance instructions executed in the normal world
affect only the normal cache. This is because secure cache
is handled differently by the cache controller due to the
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Attack Vector S Mem NS Mem S Cache NS Cache
Rd Wr Rd Wr Rd Wr Rd Wr
Software Attack    
Cold Boot Attack  
Table IV: Attacker Capability on ARM TrustZone
TrustZone protection.
The rich OS can also launch an impersonation attack. The
compromised rich OS can send an application request as the
original user. CaSE does not have any built-in mechanism to
mitigate this attack. However, an application can use mutual
authentication to thaw this attack. For the cryptographic
modules in our prototype, adversaries can launch chosen
plaintext attack and chosen cipher text attack. However, most
modern cryptography methods, including AES, are designed
to resist such attacks.
DMA requests on secure memory from peripheral devices,
such as LCD controller, are prevented by the TrustZone-
aware DMA controller (DMAC). Therefore, the rich OS
cannot program peripheral devices in the normal world to
read or write secure memory.
Lastly, the compromised rich OS can change the power
state without notifying the CaSE controller in the secure
world. In this case, all cached sensitive contents of the CaSE
controller will be lost. On subsequent invocation to CaSE
controller, all requests will be dropped. We do not consider
this as a real threat, since the attacker who already has
physical access can simply power off the device to deny
services.
B. Unrestricted Memory Read from Cold Boot Attack
Cold boot attacks are capable of reading both the normal
world memory and the secure world memory. Since a cold
boot attack physically removes DRAM chip from the system,
we assume it will be too difficult for the attacker to modify
the value in DRAM circuit without interrupting the operation
of the system. Therefore, only the confidentiality of the
memory is compromised, but not the integrity. In CaSE,
application contexts and application binaries are always
encrypted while in DRAM. The key for the encryption
is stored in the processor cache or in the on-chip secure
storage while the system is in power saving mode. Thus, it
is protected from cold boot attacks.
Since modern processor cache is built using SRAM which
does exhibit the remanence effect similar to DRAM, the
compromised OS can attempt to reboot the system to run
on a malicious OS to exploit this fact to extract sensitive
information from the cache. However, the malicious OS
would fail the high assurance booting process. Furthermore,
the SoC firmware on the ARM Cortex-A8 processor resets
the cache contents upon power reset event. Therefore, we
can prevent this attack too.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. Migrating CaSE to Other Platforms
Though our prototype implementation of CaSE is on the
i.MX53 development board, the system design is widely
applicable to other hardware platforms that can provide
isolated execution and SoC-bound memory storage.
1) Multi-core Processors: The i.MX53 has a single core
processor. For multi-core processors, it is no longer neces-
sary to suspend the execution of the rich OS. When the SoC-
bound execution runs on a subset of the cores, the other cores
can continue executing the workloads of the rich OS. It will
bring some new challenges. Though applications running in
the secure cache can still be protected by the TrustZone
isolation, applications running in the normal cache may be
compromised by the rich OS running on the other cores.
Thus, system designers need to rely on some dedicated
system features in the multi-core SoC to enable the cache
isolation. For instance, new cache controllers in both ARM
and AMD platforms [56], [57] have the capability to assign
individual last level cache block to specific processor cores.
2) On-chip Memory: To improve system performance on
embedded devices, SoC designers are continuously increas-
ing the use of silicon layout for allocating more on-chip
memory. The average percentage of layout used for memory
is 80% in the year 2008 and has been rising [58]. There are
three main categories of on-chip memory, SRAM, DRAM,
and ROM, where SRAM and DRAM are more suitable to
construct SoC-bound execution.
In our implementation of CaSE on the i.MX53, processor
cache (SRAM) is used as memory space for SoC-bound
execution. There are other choices of on-chip memory as
well. For example, the internal DRAM (iRAM) has been
used to store cryptographic data of AES [18]. The size of
iRAM varies in different systems, and it is usually small.
For example, there is only 144 KB iRAM for i.MX53 [59]
and 272 KB iRAM for i.MX6 [60]. Furthermore, certain
Board Support Package (BSP) uses the iRAM for other
purposes such as video processing [44]. Another important
difference between iRAM and processor cache is the iso-
lation mechanism. Unlike cache, iRAM occupies a range
of physical address space. The protection of this address
space from the compromised rich OS or malicious DMA-
capable I/O devices might not be available, and it is platform
specific [59], [60].
Another important consideration is the remanence effect
for on-chip memory storage. On-chip memory is free from
the physical memory extraction in cold boot attacks due to
its proximity on die. However, they still exhibit remanence
effect just as the external DRAM. When the contents are
not sanitized upon system reset, sensitive information could
leak out during the boot up process. System designers should
verify that the on-chip memory is well protected across
different power state changes including full system reset.
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Platform Software Attack Cold Boot Attack
x86 ARM Data Data Code Code Data Code
Confidentiality Integrity Confidentiality Integrity Confidentiality Confidentiality
Hardware-Assisted Execution
Intel VT-x/AMD-v based [49]    
Intel TXT/AMD SVM based [50]    
Intel SGX based [20]       
System Management Mode (SMM) based [51]    
Coprocessor based [52], [53]     
TrustZone based [54]    
SoC-bound Execution
Register based [24], [22]   
Cache-based [26], [55], [18]   
On-Chip Memory Based [18]   
CaSE       
Table V: Comparison of Secure Execution Environment under Software Attack and Cold Boot Attack
For example, on the i.MX53, processor firmware resets the
cache contents when the processor is rebooted. This can be
confirmed by the L1RSTDISABLE and L2RSTDISABLE bits
on the auxiliary control register of the Cortex-A8 processor.
3) Secure Information Flow: It is critical to secure the
information flow between the external DRAM and the on-
chip memory when adopting CaSE on other platforms.
Our implementation on the i.MX53 relies on the isolation
provided by TrustZone and the ability to lock memory
contents in cache to prevent malicious attacks. Program
contexts are encrypted before being written to the external
DRAM. Though cache locking has been supported by a
wide range of ARM processors, most x86 processors still
do not support fine-grained cache manipulation. On those
processors, information flowing out of the processor due to
cache contention can be protected by temporal separation,
which clears sensitive contents between the two executions
of the protected application.
On some new platforms that support I/O coherent
cache [61], [62], it is allowed for an I/O device to ac-
cess cache contents. To protect against potential DMA
attacks, system designers can use the inputoutput memory
management unit (IOMMU) [36] or the system memory
management unit (SMMU) [63] to secure DMA operations.
B. Supporting Unmodified Applications
CaSE has made it possible to execute arbitrary self-
contained applications in a secure execution environment
that provides both confidentiality and integrity for the code
and data of the application. To support non-trivial unmodi-
fied legacy applications, we must enhance the platform with
support for encrypted memory paging and verified system
calls in the untrusted rich OS.
1) Encrypted Memory Paging: In our current implemen-
tation of CaSE, applications are loaded and decrypted com-
pletely within the cache. However, for large size applications
that fail to fit in the cache, the current method of SoC-bound
execution will not be sufficient. CaSE can be extended to
support larger applications by keeping only the most recently
used memory pages decrypted inside the SoC while leaving
other pages encrypted in memory.
Due to the lack of hardware supported enclave such as
Intel SGX [20], memory encryption and decryption will be
triggered by the software. In order to provide seamless sup-
port for memory paging into and out of the SoC boundary,
the page fault handling routine has to be interposed. When
the application accesses a page that is not in the SoC, the
page fault can then either be handled by the rich OS [18]
or the security monitor in TrustZone [15].
While it is fairly straight forward to extend CaSE to
handle applications that do not fit in the cache, similar to
other memory encryption system [18], [64], [65] there is
a high performance penalty for applications that frequently
swap memory pages [18].
2) Verified System Calls to Rich OS: Many non-trivial
applications require OS support to perform meaningful tasks.
Our current implementation of CaSE can be further extended
to support the use of system call. Before the system call is
made, the application is paused and the application context
will be encrypted and then stored in DRAM. The system
call request is then forwarded to the untrusted rich OS. Upon
completion of the system call, the application is resumed by
decrypting the application context in the processor cache.
Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to simply enable system
call from the application. When the OS is compromised, it
is possible for the malicious OS to launch Iago attacks [66]
where the result of system calls is manipulated to subvert
a protected application. Protecting unmodified applications
in commodity operating system has been an active area of
research [67], [68], [69]. CaSE can benefit from system call
behavior verification techniques from these systems [68].
IX. RELATED WORK
To protect the wide spread of software vulnerabilities
in applications and operating systems, hardware-assisted
isolation has been widely adopted in both x86 and ARM
86
processors [50], [51], [20], [15], [54]. On the other hand,
physical memory disclosure attacks [16], [17] achieve com-
plete memory exposure through a different attack vector.
CaSE aims to provide a SoC-bound execution environment
that can defend against both attacks. Our work is closely
related to the research on isolated execution environments
and cold boot resistant computations.
A. Isolated Execution
A line of research on isolated execution environ-
ments [50], [70], [49], [71], [72], [27], [51], [73], [74], [75],
[20], [54], [4], [10], [12], [9], [8], [7], [14], [76], [53], [52]
has attracted much attention as security becomes one of the
most important aspects in modern information systems. One
of the key challenges is to bootstrap a trusted environment
and to isolate it from the untrusted environment. Earlier work
focuses on bootstrapping an isolated environment using a
high privileged entity, such as hypervisor [70], [49], [72] or
System Management Mode (SMM) [51].
As vulnerabilities are discovered routinely in the highly
complex modern OS, hardware-assisted protection is widely
used in information systems due to the attractive prop-
erty of shielding applications from potentially compromised
OS [50], [15], [54], [51], [4], [10], [12]. Intel Trusted Exe-
cution Technology (TXT) and AMD Secure Virtual Machine
(SVM) are used in [50] to create a trusted isolated execution
environment for protecting security sensitive applications.
Recognizing the lack of efficient context switching in the
TXT technology, Intel recently proposed Intel Secure Guard
Extension (SGX) [20] to provide an efficient secure enclave
for isolating sensitive applications. Moreover, data stored
outside of the processor bound enclave is automatically
encrypted by the processor. We share the same design
concept as the Intel SGX and target at achieving the same
security goals. However, SGX is a processor extension on
the x86 platform, while CaSE builds on the commodity
TrustZone enabled ARM systems.
For mobile devices that are running on ARM processors,
TrustZone has been widely adopted in [54], [4], [10], [12],
[9], [8], [7], [14]. Different from the previous works that
utilize TrustZone, CaSE attempts to address the threat of
cold boot attacks on the system. Lastly, coprocessor has
also been proposed to achieve secure computation in adverse
environment [76], [53], [52]. CaSE runs on the commodity
hardware and does not require additional dedicated copro-
cessor for code execution.
B. SoC-bound Execution
In order to defend against cold boot attack, sensitive
information has to be kept in memory areas outside the
DRAM. There are several types of memory that are inside
the physical boundary of the SoC, namely, register, cache,
and on-chip RAM. Several research works [24], [22], [23],
[77] use register to store cryptographic sensitive materials. In
[25], [26], [18], [55], the sensitive cryptographic materials
are stored in the processor cache. Alternatively, OCRAM is
used in [18]. Sentry [18] is closely related to our work. It
also uses cache locking function for CPU-bound execution.
However, similar to other cache-based SoC-bound execution,
the security of Sentry builds on the strong assumption that
the mobile OS can be trusted. We address the risk of
compromised OS attack in CaSE. Lastly, even though the
use of TrustZone and support for unmodified application
are briefly mentioned in [18], no further description of
implementations is provided.
Table. V compares CaSE with other approaches towards
secure execution environment in terms of the security pro-
tections under software attacks and cold boot attacks. As
indicated in the table, CaSE is the first to provide a SoC-
bound execution environment on ARM platforms against
both cold boot attacks and software attacks. Furthermore,
both code and data of the program are protected in CaSE.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present CaSE, a TrustZone enabled SoC-
bound execution environment to protect against both cold
boot attack and compromised rich OS attack. CaSE offers
two modes of operation, SoC-bound execution in the normal
cache and SoC-bound execution in the secure cache, which
provide a trade-off between system performance and secu-
rity. We build a crypto library and a kernel integrity checker
to demonstrate the practical usage of our system on real
ARM platform. The experimental results show that CaSE
environment only introduces little performance overhead.
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